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_______________ 
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Office of Federal Public Defender 
1001 Liberty Avenue - #1500 
Pittsburgh, PA   15222  
          Counsel for Blake Brown, Jr. 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Both the government and the defendant, Blake Brown, 
Jr., appeal an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing the indictment of 
Brown for failing to register as a sex offender.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will vacate the order and direct that 
the indictment be reinstated.  
  
I.  Background 
 
 The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”), 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., requires individuals 
convicted of certain sex crimes to submit identifying 
information to state and federal sex offender registries. 
§§ 16912(a), 16913–16914, 16919(a).  It is a violation of 
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SORNA for such individuals to travel in “interstate or foreign 
commerce” and “knowingly fail[] to register or update a 
registration.”  18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).  While the term “sex 
offender” is tautologically defined as someone who has been 
convicted of a “sex offense,”  42 U.S.C. § 16911(1), Congress 
was careful to delineate specific circumstances in which a 
conviction involving sex will not lead to classification as an 
offender under SORNA.  Among other things,
1
   
 
[a]n offense involving consensual sexual 
conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of 
[SORNA] ... if the victim was at least 13 years 
old and the offender was not more than 4 years 
older than the victim. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C) (emphasis added).  That exception is 
the pivot on which this case turns.    
 
 In August 2011, Brown was charged with failing to 
register under SORNA based on his 2003 conviction for third 
degree lewd molestation in violation of Florida Statute 
§ 800.04(5).  Although he had previously registered when he 
moved from Florida to New York, he failed to register after 
he later moved to Pennsylvania in October 2010.  At the time 
of his arrest, he was staying with his father in McKeesport, 
Pennsylvania, and admitted knowing that he needed to 
                                              
 
1
 The quoted language appears to be limited to minors, 
but a separate exception pertains to adults, making an offense 
involving consensual sexual conduct a “sex offense” for 
purposes of SORNA only if the adult victim was “under the 
custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense.”  
42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C).    
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register, though he claimed he “did not have the time” to do 
so.  (PSR ¶ 43.)   
 
 Brown pled guilty as charged, but, when it came time 
for sentencing, the District Court sua sponte raised various 
concerns regarding SORNA‟s applicability.  In particular, the 
Court expressed doubt that Brown was indeed a “sex 
offender,” given that – according to the U.S. Probation 
Office‟s Presentence Investigation Report – he was 17 years 
old and his victim was 13 years old at the time they engaged 
in the consensual sexual contact that was the basis of Brown‟s 
2003 conviction.
2
  As the Court saw it, giving Brown the 
benefit of SORNA‟s “not more than 4 years older” exception 
was “a question of ... the interests of justice.”  (App. at 203.)  
The Court therefore decided to withdraw its previous 
approval of Brown‟s guilty plea.3   
                                              
 
2
 The exception set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C) 
requires the offense to be based on a consensual act.  The 
parties appear to agree that the conduct underlying Brown‟s 
2003 conviction was “consensual,” as that term is used in 
SORNA.  One may, of course, question the meaning of 
“consensual” when the word is applied to a 13-year-old‟s 
decisions, but that issue is not before us.   
 
 
3
 In withdrawing its prior approval of Brown‟s guilty 
plea, the District Court relied on Rule 11(b)(3) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  It is debatable whether the 
District Court had authority to reject the plea after accepting 
it; Rule 11(b)(3) does not address a judge‟s revocation of a 
plea acceptance, but case law suggests that a judge can revoke 
an acceptance if there is no factual basis for a plea, United 
States v. Hecht, 638 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 1981).  We need 
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  Although the government and Brown eventually 
stipulated that Brown‟s “date of birth was exactly four years 
and four months (52 months) prior to the date of birth of the 
victim in the offense of Lewd Molestation” (Supp. App. at 
50-51), the District Court, in an order dismissing the 
indictment,
4
 held that the exception in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 16911(5)(C) is “grievous[ly]” ambiguous as applied to 
Brown (App. at 149).  According to the Court, a “colloquial” 
reading would render Brown eligible for the exception in the 
statute since, “[t]he common question, „how old are you?‟ is 
colloquially interpreted to mean, „how many complete years 
have transpired since the date of your birth?‟”  (Id. at 147 & 
n.2.)   Because Brown was 17 years old and the victim was 13 
years old at the time of the incident, the Court reasoned that 
Brown could be seen as falling within the exception since he 
was not “more than 4 years older than the victim,” but rather 
was exactly four years older.   
 
                                                                                                     
not address the issue, however, because we are vacating the 
Court‟s decision on other grounds.   
 
4
 Brown twice moved to dismiss the indictment.  The 
Court rejected the first effort, but appears to have invited the 
second.  (App. at 151 n.5 (“[T]he government has since 
indicated its willingness to stipulate to all facts necessary to 
resolve the interpretation of SORNA‟s consensual sexual 
conduct exception, which leaves the court more flexibility to 
consider a pretrial motion to dismiss without itself finding 
facts or making credibility determinations that should be left 
to the jury.”).)  It is the District Court‟s order responding to 
that second motion that we now address.  
 6 
 
 At the same time, the Court acknowledged that Brown 
indeed “was more than four years older than the victim 
because he was born more than four years before the victim.”  
(Id. at 147-48.)  Math would therefore seem to dictate that 
Brown could not claim the exception, but, the Court said, if 
“Congress [had] intended for such a strict measurement of 
age to apply (particularly in the context of comparing two 
people‟s relative ages), Congress could have defined the 
difference in reference to months.”  (Id. at 5.)  Because 
Congress did not specify how “years” were to be calculated, 
and because resort to legislative history did not clarify what 
was meant by the word “years,” the Court applied the rule of 
lenity to dismiss the indictment.
5
 
 
 The government timely appealed the dismissal, and 
Brown filed a cross-appeal seeking to preserve a variety of 
issues.
6
  
                                              
 
5
 The rule of lenity is a doctrine providing “that a 
court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets 
out multiple or inconsistent punishment, should resolve the 
ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishments.”  
BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1449 (9th ed. 2009).   
 
 
6
 In his cross-appeal, Brown raises the following 
additional arguments: (1) that SORNA encroaches upon 
state‟s power and violates the Tenth Amendment; (2) that 
Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause 
in enacting SORNA; (3) that application of SORNA to pre-
enactment offenders violates the ex-post facto clause; (4) that 
SORNA unconstitutionally infringes on the right to travel; (5) 
that prosecution under SORNA violates the Due Process 
Clause; (6) that federal courts must apply a categorical 
 7 
 
                                                                                                     
approach in evaluating SORNA predicate offenses; and (7) 
that Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine by giving 
the Attorney General blanket authority to determine the 
applicability of SORNA to offenders who were convicted of 
sex offenses before SORNA was enacted.    
 Given the attention we and other circuit courts have 
already paid to the first five issues, we do not address them 
again here.  Brown in fact concedes that our decision in 
United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 158-63 (3d Cir. 
2010), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012), forecloses those arguments.  He 
raises them only to “preserve[] [them] for further review.”   
(Brown‟s Opening Br. at 56-60.)   
 We do not have to address Brown‟s “categorical 
approach” argument, given his stipulation regarding consent 
and regarding his age and the age of his victim.  It is 
nevertheless worth noting that the categorical approach was 
created to prevent “sentencing courts from inquiring into the 
facts underlying prior convictions, fearing that this would 
unleash endless re-litigation of old charges and raise Sixth 
Amendment concerns.” United States v. Tucker, 703 F.3d 
205, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 
U.S. 575, 601-02 (1990)).  We are not addressing sentencing 
here but a separate crime.   
 Finally, with respect to the question of whether 
Congress violated the non-delegation doctrine, the District 
Court did not address non-delegation either in its 
memorandum opinion and order denying Brown‟s first 
motion to dismiss the indictment or in the later memorandum 
opinion and order granting dismissal.  We therefore abstain 
from ruling on it, so that, on remand, the District Court may 
consider the issue in the first instance.    
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II. Discussion7 
  
 The dispositive question before us is what is meant by 
the word “years” in 42 U.S.C. §  16911(5)(C).  The District 
Court decided that the use in that statute of the phrase “more 
than 4 years older than the victim” is “susceptible to more 
than one reasonable interpretation” (App. at 3), but we 
disagree.  
 
 “[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the 
language of the statute itself.”  Consumer Prod. Safety 
Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).  
When words are not defined within the statute, we construe 
them “in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural 
meaning.”  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).  We do 
not, however, do so blindly.   
 
[F]requently words of general meaning are used 
in a statute ... and yet a consideration of the 
whole legislation, or of the circumstances 
surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd 
results which follow from giving such broad 
                                                                                                     
 
 
7
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the District Court‟s decision turns on 
statutory construction, we review the matter de novo.  
Samaroo v. Samaroo, 193 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 1999) (“We 
must review legal conclusions and questions of statutory 
construction de novo.”)  
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meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to 
believe that the legislator intended to include 
the particular act.   
 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 
(1892).  In such cases, resorting to dictionary definitions may 
be helpful.  See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994) (stating, based on “[v]irtually every 
dictionary,” that “„to modify‟ means to change moderately or 
in minor fashion”).  Ultimately, though, “[a]mbiguity is a 
creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory 
context,”  Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994), so 
the touchstone of statutory analysis should, again, be the 
statute itself.  
 
 As already noted, § 16911(5)(C) provides that an 
offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex 
offense under SORNA as long as the victim “was at least 13 
years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older 
than the victim.”  42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C).  In common 
usage, a year means 365 consecutive days (except, of course, 
when a leap year adds a day) or 12 months.  See, e.g., Black‟s 
Law Dictionary 1754 (9th ed. 2009) (“A consecutive 365-day 
period beginning at any point.”).  We therefore conclude that 
the term “4 years” is not ambiguous: it is quite precisely 
1,461 days
8
 or 48 months.  While the word “years” on its own 
or in some colloquial usage could perhaps be thought 
ambiguous, the word is not floating in abstract isolation or 
                                              
 
8
 Because every fourth year is a leap year, and there 
are 366 days in a leap year, there are 365 + 365+ 365 + 366 
days, or 1,461 days in a four-year time frame.  
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casual conversation here; it is set in the specific terms of a 
specific statute, and it has a discernible meaning in that 
context.  “[M]ore than 4 years” means anything in excess of 
1,461 days.    
 
 Considering “years” to mean whole years only, as the 
District Court suggests, would lead to strange results in the 
application of SORNA.  The government rightly notes that 
using the “„colloquial method‟ of calculating whether an 
offender was „more than 4 years older‟ than his victim would 
create alternating windows of time” in which the same 
offense involving the same two participants “sometimes 
would require registration under SORNA and sometimes 
[would] not, depending upon the time of the year their sexual 
congress took place.”  (Gov‟t‟s Opening Br. at 20.)  In other 
words, if we take Brown‟s Florida offense as an example and 
we were to assume that Brown‟s date of birth was May 1, 
1984, and his victim‟s date of birth was September 1, 1988 – 
exactly four years and four months later – Brown would only 
need to register under SORNA if he had been convicted of 
having sexual contact with her at any point between May 1st 
through August 31st of any year between 2002 and 2004, 
when he was “colloquially” five years older, but he would not 
need to register for a conviction involving the same conduct 
at other times.
9
  That cannot be the law.   
                                              
9
 To be specific, a “colloquial” reading of the sort 
considered by the District Court creates windows of time in 
which Brown sometimes is five years older than the victim 
and other times is “not more than four years older”:  between 
September 1, 2001, and April 30, 2002, Brown would be 17 
years old and his victim 13 years old; between May 1, 2002, 
and August 31, 2002, Brown would be 18 years old and his 
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 The District Court expressed concern that considering 
“ 4 years” literally as an accumulation of lesser units of time 
could “require a calculation down to the month, day, hour, 
minute, or even second in order to calculate the difference in 
age between a defendant and victim.”  (App. at 5 (footnote 
omitted).)  But demanding some precision – at least as to 
days
10
 – is more sound than the conclusion that no one is 
                                                                                                     
victim 13 years old; between September 1, 2002, and April 
30, 2003, Brown would be 18 years old and his victim 14 
years old; between May 1, 2003, and August 31, 2003, Brown 
would be 19 years old and his victim 14 years old; between 
September 1, 2003, and April 30, 2004, Brown would be 19 
years old and his victim 15 years old; and between May 1, 
2004, and August 31, 2004, Brown would be 20 years old and 
his victim 15 years old.  
The overall span of time during which this is relevant 
is between September 1, 2001, when the victim turns 13 years 
old (triggering the possible application of SORNA‟s “not 
more than 4 years older” exception), and August 31, 2004, 
just before she turns 16 years old, because the statute under 
which Brown was convicted, Florida Statute § 800.04, 
criminalizes an act such as Brown‟s only when the victim is 
under 16 years of age.  
  
 
10
 It seems highly unlikely that a prosecution will ever 
be brought on the basis that someone who is exactly 4 years 
older than another by birth-date will be prosecuted under 
SORNA on the theory that, by hours or minutes, the offender 
was “more than 4 years older.”  We are not required to 
address extreme hypotheticals.  See Poole v. Family Court, 
368 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We will not permit our 
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“more than 4 years older” than someone else unless he is 
actually five years older.    
 
 Because the words “no more than 4 years older” have 
a clearly discernible meaning here, applying the rule of lenity 
was not necessary.  We have held that the “simple existence 
of some statutory ambiguity ... is not sufficient to warrant 
application of the rule of lenity, for most statutes are 
ambiguous to some degree.”  United States v. Kouevi, 698 
F.3d 126, 138 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Dean v. United States, 
556 U.S. 568, 577 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
superseded on other grounds.  Rather, the rule only applies in 
those cases “in which a reasonable doubt persists about a 
statute‟s intended scope,” United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 
315 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), after 
consulting “every thing [sic] from which aid can be derived.”  
United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134, 1139 n.6 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The rule is therefore an 
interpretative method of “last resort” and “need not be applied 
when the intent of Congress is already clear based on an 
                                                                                                     
interpretation of Rule 4(a)(6) to be governed by such an 
extreme hypothetical.  If at some time in the future we are 
presented with such an outrageous case, we are confident that 
we have the tools to ensure that the right to appeal is not 
defeated.”); see also NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 
719 F.3d 203, 238 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing the concern 
that “[t]he terror of extreme hypotheticals produces much bad 
law” (quoting Marozsan v. United States, 852 F.2d 1469, 
1498 (7th Cir.1988) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 
 13 
 
analysis of the plain meaning of the statute.”  Valansi v. 
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 214 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002).
 11
   
 
 Though we have not ruled before on the meaning of 
“years” in this exact context,12 several state courts have 
interpreted how to count “years” when applying sexual 
offense statutes.  The Connecticut Supreme Court observed 
that “common sense dictates that in comparing the relative 
ages of individuals, the difference in their ages is determined 
by reference to their respective birth dates.”  State v. Jason B., 
729 A.2d 760, 767 (Conn. 1999).  Florida, Wisconsin, and 
North Carolina have each relied on that interpretation to 
conclude that the phrase “more than 4 years older” within 42 
U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C) or similar statutes means more than 
1,461 days older.  See State v. Marcel, 67 So.3d 1223, 1225 
                                              
 
11
 It is true that on one occasion we stated that “the rule 
of lenity should be employed to „resolv[e] any ambiguity in 
the ambit of [a criminal] statute‟s coverage,” United States v. 
Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1214 (3d Cir. 1994) (alterations in 
original) (citation omitted).  That comment, however, cannot 
be taken literally, since doing so would be at odds with our 
own precedent, as set forth in the cases cited above, and with 
Supreme Court precedent.  See Chapman v. United States, 
500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (“The rule of lenity, however, is not 
applicable unless there is a „grievous ambiguity or uncertainty 
in the language and structure of the Act‟... .”).  
 
 
12
 Cf. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor v. Gardner, 882 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the word “year” in that federal regulation 
“means 365 days”).   
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(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“If a defendant is one day past the 
four-year eligibility ... [he] clearly is „greater‟ or „of a larger 
amount‟ than four years.”); State v. Parmley, 785 N.W.2d 
655, 662 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (“From these cases we 
conclude that to calculate the disparity of ages ... to determine 
if an actor is exempt from registering as a sex offender, the 
time between the birth dates of the two parties is to be 
determined.”); State v. Faulk, 683 S.E.2d 265, 267 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2009) (“Neither our legislature nor this Court deals only 
in whole integers of years, and, as such, this argument must 
fail.  So too does defendant‟s argument that a plain language 
analysis of the statute requires this Court to consider the 
everyday conversational meaning of age differences... .”).  
That conclusion is, we think, entirely correct.  
 
III.  Conclusion 
 
 Because Brown was, as he has stipulated, more than 4 
years older than his victim at the time of the offense giving 
rise to his 2003 conviction, we will vacate the order 
dismissing the indictment and direct that the indictment be 
reinstated.   
